University of California, Hastings College of the Law

UC Hastings Scholarship Repository
Faculty Scholarship

1991

Evidence Scholarship, Old and New
Roger C. Park
UC Hastings College of the Law, parkr@uchastings.edu

Follow this and additional works at: http://repository.uchastings.edu/faculty_scholarship
Part of the Evidence Commons
Recommended Citation
Roger C. Park, Evidence Scholarship, Old and New, 75 Minn. L. Rev. 849 (1991).
Available at: http://repository.uchastings.edu/faculty_scholarship/603

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Faculty Scholarship
by an authorized administrator of UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact marcusc@uchastings.edu.

Faculty Publications
UC Hastings College of the Law Library
Park

Roger

Author:

Roger C. Park

Source:

Minnesota Law Review

Citation:

75 Minn. L. Rev. 849 (1991).

Title:

Evidence Scholarship, Old and New

Originally published in MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW. This article is reprinted with permission
from MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW and University of Minnesota Law School.

Evidence Scholarship, Old and New
Roger C. Park*
INTRODUCTION
There is no real debate over whether legal scholarship
should make use of insights and methods from other disciplines. That debate was won, in principle at least, by the Legal
Realists in the 1920s. The question now is whether traditional
legal scholarship still has important value in light of what has
been called "the decline of law as an autonomous discipline."'
In this Essay, I will examine that question in the context of
scholarship on evidence.
As in other fields, modem evidence scholarship has made
use of techniques and insights from disciplines other than law.
The best-known interdisciplinary movements have, however,
had little or no influence on evidence scholarship. For example, law and economics scholars have written virtually nothing
on evidence.2 One rarely sees evidence problems expressly analyzed in terms of economic efficiency, opportunity costs, or the
demand for a legal good. This silence cannot be based on the
idea that evidence is in some way a non-economic subject. In
other fields not traditionally considered economic, such as criminal law, law and economics scholars have applied economic approaches to non-market behaviors. Another major movement,
critical legal studies, has not touched evidence at all. No one

has attempted to deconstruct the hearsay rule, or to show that
* Fredrikson & Byron Professor of Law, University of Minnesota. This
Essay is based on my inaugural lecture as the Fredrikson & Byron Professor
of Law at the University of Minnesota. I wish to thank Dan Farber, Steve
Penrod, Peter Tillers, and Gerald Torres for their insights and help, while exonerating them from any responsibility for the contents of the lecture or this
Essay. I also wish to thank Brendan Randall for his assistance in preparing
this Essay.
1. Posner, The Decline of Law as an Autonomous Discipline: 1962-1987,
100 HARV. L. REV.761, 772 (1987).
2. Of course, "virtually nothing" is not the same as "nothing." For a recent evidence article that uses insights from law and economics scholarship,
see Kaplow & Shavell, Legal Advice About Information to Present in Litigation: Its Effects and Social Desirability,102 HARv. L. REV. 567, 576-93 (1989).
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it is incoherent or a mask for illegitimate hierarchies. Similarly, members of the practical legal studies movement 3 have
not yet written explicitly about how its tenets apply to evidence
law, and no member of the law and literature movement
sought to apply theories of literary criticism to a critique of evi4
dence law.

Because the major scholarly movements are motivated at
least in part by ideology, members of these movements tend to
devote their time to the legal subjects that they believe raise
the most important issues of social policy. That tendency may
explain why they have overlooked the subject of evidence. Evidence, like other procedural subjects, is often seen as a technical subject primarily of interest to judges and trial lawyers.
Considering critical legal studies in particular, there may be
other reasons why that movement has not taken hold with evidence scholars. Perhaps evidence scholars are so thoroughly
imbued with the tradition of optimistic rationalism5 that they
are not attracted to the movement. Perhaps faculty members
who choose to teach evidence feel a degree of fondness for our
existing trial system, just as those who teach securities regulation tend not to hope for the end of capitalism.
The lack of activity by members of these contemporary
scholarly movements does not mean, however, that scholarship
on evidence consists solely of traditional writing about rules of
law. Nondoctrinal scholars have made many significant contributions. In this Essay, I will try to give generalists a sense of
the nontraditional work that has been taking place in evidence
scholarship. I will also comment upon the continuing role of
doctrinal scholarship, and on its future in a scholarly commu3. See, e.g., Eskridge & Frickey, Statutory Interpretation as Practical
Reasoning, 42 STAN. L. REv. 321 (1990); Farber, Legal Pragmatism and the
Constitution, 72 MINN. L. REV. 1331 (1988); Farber and Frickey, PracticalReason and the FirstAmendment, 34 UCLA L. REV. 1615 (1987); Kronman, Alexander Bickel's Philosophy of Prudence, 94 YALE L.J. 1567 (1985); cf Posner,
The Jurisprudenceof Skepticism, 86 MICH. L. REv. 827, 837-58, 887 (1988) (discussing his view of practical reasoning and distinguishing it from Frickey and
Farber's). See generally Feinman, PracticalLegal Studies and CriticalLegal
Studies, 87 MICH. L. REV. 724 (1989) (discussing practical legal studies movement and comparing and contrasting it to critical legal studies movement).
4. For a critical view of the concerns of this group of scholars, see R.
POSNER, LAW AND LITERATURE 353-64 (1988); cf. Burton, JudgePosner'sJuris-

prudence of Skepticism (Book Review), 87 MICH. L. REv. 710, 710-23 (1988)
(reviewing R. POSNER, LAw AND LITERATURE (1988)).
5. See W. TWINING, THEORIES OF EVIDENCE: BENTHAM AND WIGMORE 16

(1985).
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nity that contains many evidence scholars who are willing and
able to use other tools.
I.

SCHOLARSHIP ON THE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF
EVIDENCE

Scholars who study the social psychology of evidence have
investigated how rules of evidence affect jury decision-making,
how juries react to evidence, whether psychological assumptions underlying rules of evidence are valid, and what factors
influence the reliability of evidence given by witnesses. These
topics tie in with the interest of social psychologists in human
perception, human memory, and group processes. Examples of
their work include studies on whether juries follow limiting instructions, 6 studies on the impact of prior convictions on the
trier of fact,7 and studies on the impact of exclusion of evidence
upon jury decisionmaking.8
Sometimes a lawyer will approach social science research
with inflated skepticism. When research results are inconsistent with conventional common sense, the lawyer is likely to
say that something is wrong with the research; and when results are consistent with common sense, the lawyer will see the
project as the elaborate demonstration of the obvious by means
that are obscure.9
My friends who are social scientists probably do not feel
any need to respond to legal philistines, or for me to do so in
their stead. Nonetheless, I will give an indirect response. It
takes the form of an example that avoids both prongs of the
seemingly inescapable dilemma: a study that is neither
counterintuitive nor obvious.
In introducing this study, I will ask readers to consider a
hypothetical. Suppose that the police are attempting to help a
6. E.g., Cox & Tanford, Effects of Evidence and Instruction in Civil Trials: An Experimental Investigationof Rules of Admissibility, 4 Soc. BEHAV.
31 (1989); Wissler & Saks, On the Inefficiency of Limiting Instructions: When
Jurors Use Prior Conviction Evidence to Decide on Guilt, 9 LAW & HUM.
BEHAV. 37 (1985).
7. E.g., Sue, Smith & Cadwell, Effects of Inadmissible Evidence on the
Decisions of Simulated Jurors: A Moral Dilemma, 3 J. APPLIED SOC. PSY-

CHOLOGY 345 (1973); Wissler & Saks, supra note 6.
8. E.g., Borgida, Legal Reform of Rape Laws, 2 APPLIED Soc. PSYCHOOGY ANN. 211 (1981); Wolf & Montgomery, Effects of Inadmissible Evidence
and JudicialAdmonishment to Disregardon the Judgments of Mock Jurors,7
J. APPLIED Soc. PSYCHOLOGY 205 (1977).
9. Meehl, Law and the Fireside Inductions: Some Reflections of a
ClinicalPsychologist,27 J. Soc. IssuEs 65, 67 (1971).
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robbery victim identify the robber, and they show the victim a
photospread that consists of three photos mounted on a sheet of
paper. Is there a problem with this method of eliciting an identification? Common sense provides some answers - for example, perhaps the photospread would be better if it contained
more than three photos. One would have to think long and
hard, however, before coming up with the idea that the identification would be more accurate had the victim been shown the
photos one at a time, and asked to make a yes/no decision on
each photo before going on to the next one. And even those
who thought of that idea would not have any means of testing
it without using social science methods.
A recent study by Brian Cutler and Steven Penrod indicates that when suspects are presented sequentially in a lineup
or photospread instead of being presented simultaneously, the
accuracy of identification is enhanced.'L In the experiment,
subjects were shown a videotaped reenactment of an armed
robbery and later were asked to identify the robber from a
lineup or a photospread. Some of the subjects were shown all
the lineup or photospread members simultaneously, and were
asked whether the robber was present. Other subjects were
shown lineup or photospread members sequentially, and asked
to give a yes/no answer for each member as he was produced."
The subjects who saw the lineup or photospread members sequentially were less likely to make false identifications. 2 One
might expect that there also would be a loss in correct identifications among the second group of subjects, because they might
be less ready to make any identification at all. The experiment13
ers, however, found no loss in correct identifications.
Studies that deal with the topic of eyewitness identification
testimony are probably the most widely known category of evidence-related social science studies. The eyewitness studies address questions such as: How reliable are eyewitnesses? What
are the factors that affect reliability? How accurate are jurors
in evaluating reliability? The researchers, principally using laboratory experiments in which subjects are asked to perform
identification tasks, have made a number of important findings
about eyewitness identification.
10. Cutler & Penrod, Improving the Reliability of Eyewitness Identfcation: Lineup Constructionand Presentation,73 J. APPLIED PSYCHOLOGY 281,
285-86, 288 (1988).
11. Id at 281, 286.
12. Id at 286, 288.
13. Id
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Findings about unconscious transference are one example.
Unconscious transference is a phenomenon that can cause erroneous identification of suspects. 14 In one case, a ticket clerk
who had been robbed firmly identified a sailor as the robber.
The sailor, however, turned out to have an airtight alibi. The
ticket clerk evidently recognized the sailor because the sailor
had bought tickets on three occasions from the clerk, not because the sailor was the robber.' 5 The social psychology scholars have demonstrated in the laboratory that unconscious
transference is a common phenomenon, and that it may infect
identifications when, for example, a witness saw a photo of the
suspect as part of a photospread before identifying the suspect
in a lineup. At the lineup, the witness may recognize the suspect because of the photo, transfer that recognition to the robbery scene, and erroneously identify the suspect as the
6
robber.'
In other studies, social psychologists have found that a witness's confidence in the identification - whether the witness
will say "I'm certain he's the one" - has a modest relationship
at best to the accuracy of the identification, and the relationship is weakest when the conditions for identification are
poor.'7 They also have found that witnesses are much less accurate when doing cross-racial identifications than when identifying members of their own race;' 8 that when a weapon is
present, "weapon focus" often interferes with witness's ability
to identify faces;' 9 that moderate levels of stress enhance a witness's ability to acquire, retain, and retrieve information but
that higher levels interfere with it. 20 Social psychologists also
14. See generally E. LoFTus, EYEWITNESS TESTIMONY 142-44 (1979) (discussing unconscious transference).
15. 1d& at 142.
16. See id. at 151.
17. E.g., Cutler & Penrod, ForensicallyRelevant Moderators of the Relation Between Eyewitness Identification Accuracy and Confuence, 74 J. APPLIED PSYCHOLOGY 650, 652 (1989); Deffenbacher, Eyewitness Accuracy and
Confidence. Can We Infer Anything About Their Relationship?, 4 LAw &
HUM. BEHAv. 243, 250-57 (1980); Wells & Murray, Eyewitness Confidence, in
EYEWITNESS TESTIMONY: PSYCHOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES 168-70 (1984).

18. E.g., Malpass & Kravitz, Recognition of Faces of Own and Other Race,
13 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOLOGY 330, 333 (1969); Platz & Hosch, CrossRacial/Ethnic Eyewitness Identification: A Field Study, 18 J. APPLIED Soc.
PSYCHOLOGY 972, 981-83 (1988).
19. E.g., Loftus & Loftus, Some Facts About 'Weapon Focus," 11 LAw &
HUm. BEHAv. 55, 61-62 (1987); Maas & Kahnken, Eyewitness Identification:
Simulating the "Weapon .Effec4" 13 LAw & HUM. BEHAV. 397, 405 (1989).
20. E.g., E. LOFrUS, supra note 14, at 33.

HeinOnline -- 75 Minn. L. Rev. 853 1990-1991

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 75:849

have discovered that we overrate our own ability to identify,21
and that jurors are ill-equipped to assess the accuracy of identi22
fication testimony.
Although research on the social psychology of evidence focuses primarily upon evidence, not the rules of evidence, much
of it has relevance to the rules. Studies of the impact of character evidence or limiting instructions have direct relevance to issues of rule reform and interpretation. For example, whether
eyewitness identification experts should be allowed to testify
has itself become a controversial doctrinal issue.2
II.

"NEW EVIDENCE SCHOLARSHIP"

A second group of evidence scholars has embraced the
term "new evidence scholarship" to describe their work.2 As
one might infer from inclusiveness of the name under which
the school marches, the boundaries of its work cannot be precisely defined. The work of the new evidence scholars, however, is often characterized by use of academic tools derived
from study of logic and mathematics. Its scholars commonly
use mathematical notations, non-word symbols, and graphic
representations to express their thoughts.25 They tend to be interested in the science of proof, rather than in evidence as a
system of rules, although some of the new evidence scholars
have modeled or evaluated specific rules. 25
Many of the scholars in this area use probability theory as
a tool in examining evidence issues. Among American law
professors, scholarly interest in probability theory received its
most significant boost from a celebrated case, People v. Col21. E.g., Bothwell, Brigham & Deffenbacher, Correlation of Eyewitness
Accuracy and Confldence: Optimality Hypothesis Revisited, 72 J. APPLIED
PSYCHOLOGY 691, 693-94 (1987).
22. E.g., Cutler, Penrod & Stuve, Juror Decision Making in Eyewitness
Identification Cases, 12 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 41, 54 (1988); Wells, How Adequate is Human Intuition for Judging Eyewitness Testimony, in EYEWITNESS
TESTIMONY: PSYCHOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES, supra note 17, at 271-72.
23. See, e.g., State v. Chapple, 135 Ariz. 281, 290-97, 660 P.2d 1208, 1217-24
(1983); Loftus, Expert Testimony on the Eyewitness, in EYEWITNESS TESTIMONY: PSYCHOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES, supra note 17, at 273.

24.

PROBABILITY AND INFERENCE IN THE LAW OF EVIDENCE: THE USES

AND LIMrrs OF BAYESIANISM at x (P. Tillers & E. Green eds. 1988) [hereinafter
PROBABILITY AND INFERENCE].
25. See Lempert, The New Evidence Scholarship: Analyzing the Process
of Proof,in PROBABILITY AND INFERENCE, supra note 24, at 62.
26. E.g., Allen, A Reconceptualization of Civil Trials, in PROBABILITY AND
INFERENCE, supra note 24, at 43-47; Lempert, Modeling Relevance, 75 MICH. L.
REV. 1021 (1977).
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lins,2 7 a 1968 decision of the California Supreme Court. The
trial prosecutor in Collins had sought to bolster shaky eyewitness identification testimony by introducing expert testimony.
indicating that the accused couple had characteristics present in
only one couple in twelve million. 28 The testimony, and the
prosecutor's use of it, involved some fundamental statistical errors. 29 In a discerning opinion that has found its way into many
of the evidence casebooks, the California Supreme Court held
the evidence inadmissible.30
The Collins case inspired an article in the HarvardLaw Review arguing that although Collins was correct on its facts, experts in other cases properly might use probability theory, in
particular Bayes' Theorem, to aid the jury in making identifica27. 68 Cal. 2d 319, 438 P.2d 33, 66 Cal. Rptr. 497 (1968). Collins was not, of
course, the only significant influence. For an example of an important work
that preceded the California Supreme Court's opinion in Collins, see Kaplan,
Decision Theory and the FactfindingProcess,20 STAN. L. REV. 1065 (1968).
28. The eyewitnesses had testified that the robbers were a black man with
a beard and moustache and a blond-haired white woman with a ponytail who
escaped in a partly yellow car. Collins, 68 Cal. 2d at 325-26, 438 P.2d at 36-37,
66 Cal. Rptr. at 500-01. At trial, the victim was unable to identify the defendants and the other witness's identification was impeached by his testimony at
the preliminary hearing that he was uncertain about the identification. As a
result, the prosecutor asked an expert to assume that one car in ten was yellow, one man in four had a moustache, one man in ten was a black man with a
beard, one woman in ten had a ponytail, and so forth. I&i at 325 n.10, 438 P.2d
at 37 n.10, 66 Cal. Rptr. at 501 n.10. The expert then applied the product rule,
multiplying the probabilities of each trait to determine the probability of them
all occurring together. The expert arrived at the conclusion that only one
couple in 12 million would share the six characteristics identified by the witnesses. I&i at 325, 438 P.2d at 37, 66 Cal. Rptr. at 501.
29. The prosecutor turned the expert's conclusion into an argument that
there could be but one chance in 12 million that the defendants were innocent.
Id The expert's testimony and the prosecutor's argument were quite misleading. First, the prosecutor pulled the probabilities out of thin air. There was no
evidence, for example, that one car in ten was yellow or that one woman in
ten had a ponytail. IH. at 327, 438 P.2d at 39, 66 Cal. Rptr. at 502. Second, even
if the assumed probabilities were correct, multiplication under the product
rule was a statistical error because the prosecutor failed to show that the traits
were independent. I& at 328-29, 438 P.2d at 39, 66 Cal. Rptr. at 503. Finally,
even if it had been true that only one randomly chosen couple in 12 million
would have the six characteristics, the prosecutor erred in equating that
number with the chance that the couple was innocent. I& at 330, 438 P.2d at
40, 66 Cal. Rptr. at 504. If there were 20 million couples in southern California
and the chance of any couple having the six characteristics were one in 12 million, the chance that two couples sharing those characteristics were present in
the area would be closer to one in two than one in 12 million.
30. Id. at 330, 438 P.2d at 41, 66 Cal. Rptr. at 505.
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tion decisions. 3 ' The authors suggested a hypothetical case in
which the defendant is accused of murdering his girlfriend. A
partial palmprint was found on the knife that was used in the
murder. It matches the defendant's palm. Yet the palmprint
would also match the palm of one in a thousand people chosen
at random, which means that in a metropolitan area hundreds
of people would have the same palmprint characteristics.3 2
How is the jury to use that one in a thousand figure? Bayes'
Theorem, which provides a way of determining how an evaluation of probability based upon initial evidence should be modified in light of additional evidence, could serve as a guide to the
jury. If the trier of fact believed that the prior probability of
defendant's guilt (before taking the palmprint into account)
was 25%, Bayes' Theorem indicates that the trier should believe
the posterior probability of guilt (after taking the palmprint
into account) is 99.9%.33 The method often yields higher
probabilities than intuition would yield. For example, if the
prior probability is 25% and the frequency of the palmprint is
one in a hundred, the posterior probability of guilt is 97%.34
The proposition that the jury should be instructed about
Bayes' Theorem attracted the attention of a talented and resourceful debater, Laurence Tribe, then a young assistant professor at the Harvard Law School. 5 Tribe pointed out a host of
problems. It would be difficult for jurors who are not familiar
with formal probabilities to arrive at a consistent understanding of what they are supposed to do in formulating a prior
probability.3 6 There is also a danger of the jury "dwarfing soft
variables," that is, that the jury might overlook issues that cannot be quantified as it became mesmerized with those that
could.3 7 Moreover, uncertainty about predicate facts can require the jury to make so many quantification decisions about
so many issues that use of the theorem would be more confus31. Finkelstein & Fairley, A Bayesian Approach to Identification Evidence, 83 HARv. L. REV. 489, 501-09 (1970).
32. Id at 497.
33. Id. at 500.
34. Id
35. See Tribe, Trial by Mathematics: Precision and Ritual in the Legal
Process,84 HARv. L. REv. 1329 (1971).
36. Tribe, supra note 35, at 1358-59. Tribe pointed out that to some jurors
a probability of 50% might stand for what the chances were before any evidence was introduced, while to others it might mean that the search has to be
narrowed to two suspects. Id.
37. Id. at 1361-65.
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ing than helpful. 38
Although Tribe's view seems to have carried the day with
regard to the use of Bayes' Theorem in instructing the jury,39
the debate did stimulate interest in Bayes' Theorem and
probability theory. It has spawned a considerable body of scholarship that explores how probability theory might be used as a
means of proof or as a way to help scholars model and evaluate
40
trial processes.
A comprehensive description of topics that the new evidence scholars have examined is beyond the scope of this Essay
and the cope of this author. Some of the more accessible articles, however, have dealt with the following issues: whether
Bayes' Theorem can be used to model relevance as a way of
helping law students and others understand the meaning of
Federal Rules of Evidence 401 and 402;4' whether the technique
of route analysis can aid in understanding and analyzing hearsay problems;42 whether Wigmore's "chart method" of organiz43
ing and evaluating evidence should be revived and refined;
whether judicial instructions to find for a plaintiff who has established each element by a preponderance are misguided
(under the product rule this instruction might, when there is
doubt about more than one element, result in a verdict for the
plaintiff even though the chances of all elements being true are
less than 50%);4 whether judicial reluctance to allow verdicts
38. I at 1364. For Bayes' Theorem to be helpful in the situation hypothesized by Finkelstein and Fairley, one has to assume that the handprint expert
is accurate and that the person whose print is on the knife is the killer. The
juror who does not accept these two facts as absolutely certain has to discount
the probability figure obtained by using Bayes' Theorem; and giving instructions about how to do this would be too complicated to be feasible. I&
39. Lempert, supra note 25, at 62. I do not mean to suggest that Bayes'
Theorem has no place in the courtroom. Expert witnesses can and do use it in
calculating probability in certain contexts, as in using blood tests to determine

paternity. See, e.g., Imms v. Clarke, 654 S.W.2d 281, 287 (Mo. Ct. App. 1983)
(upholding use of Bayes' Theorem to determine probability of paternity).
40. See generally PROBABILITY AND INFERENCE, supra note 24 (collection
of papers addressing the uses and limits of Bayes' Theorem in adjudication
factfinding originally presented at a symposium on probability and inference
in the law of evidence).

41. See Lempert, supra note 26.
42. Friedman, Route Analysis of Credibility and Hearsay, 96 YALE L.J.
667 (1987).
43. W. TwINiNG, supra note 5, at 179-86; W. WINING, RETHINKING EvIDENCE 239-42 (1990); cf. J. WIGMORE, SCIENCE OF JUDICIAL PROOF §§ 340-52, at
858-81 (3d ed. 1937) (discussing chart method).
44. Allen, supra note 26, at 24-25, Lempert, supra note 25, at 69-70.
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to be based on "naked statistics" is justifiable. 45
III. SCHOLARSHIP ON LAW AND FORENSIC SCIENCE
Another school of nondoctrinal evidence scholarship examines issues of law and forensic science. These scholars include
those who write about subjects such as DNA profiling, the polygraph, voiceprints, and questioned document examiners. A
prominent recent example of this scholarship is a 1989 article
in the University of Pennsylvania Law Review, by three law
professors (one of whom also has a doctorate in psychology),
entitled Exorcism of Ignoranceas a Proxy for Rational Knowl'' 46
edge: The Lessons of HandwritingIdentification "Expertise.
This article examines several studies addressing the reliability
of questioned documents examiners - for example, studies
based upon sending a sample of handwriting of known origin to
examiners and asking them to pick from several exemplars a
writing executed by the same person. The authors are severely
critical of documents examiners, concluding that "[a] rather
generous reading of the data would be that in 45% of the reports forensic document examiners reached the correct finding,
in 36% they erred partially or completely, and in 19% they
were unable to draw a conclusion." 47 Omitting one test that the
authors characterized as unrealistically easy (so easy that it was
comparable to a lineup consisting of four beefy white policemen
and a skinny black person), they said that a less generous reading of the data was that the examiners were correct 36% of the
time, erroneous 42%, and unable to reach a conclusion 22% of
the time. 48 In tests in which disguised handwriting was used in which the exemplars contained some attempts to forge documents - the accuracy levels were abysmally low. 49 The authors concluded that the acceptance of documents examiner
testimony was an example of an attempt to "exorcise ignorance." The legal system, when it has to wrestle with having to
make decisions that cannot be made rationally, exorcises igno45. E.g., Kaye, The Limits of the Preponderanceof the Evidence Standard.Justifiably Naked Statistical Evidence and Multiple Causation, 1982 AM. B.
FOUND. RES. J. 487. For a recent review of a variety of "naked statistics" issues, see Shaviro, Commentary: Statistical-ProbabilityEvidence and the Appearance of Justice, 103 HARv. L. REV. 530 (1989).
46. 137 U. PA. L. REV. 731 (1989).
47. 1d. at 747.

48. Id. at 748.
49. Id.
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rance by accepting bogus expertise.5°
IV.

DOCTRINAL SCHOLARSHIP

The next class of evidence scholar is the one into which I
fall myself. We are often called "doctrinal analysts." I am not
completely happy with this label. It connotes that all this class
of scholars does is analyze and synthesize, tear apart cases and
put them back together again.5 ' But I have not been able to
come up with a better label ("law-centered legal scholarship" is
not wholly satisfactory), so I will stick to the conventional one.
The label refers to those of us who write about what the rules
are and how they ought to be improved. Our primary tools for
analysis and critique are the ones we picked up in law school:
the ability to analyze and synthesize doctrine and an understanding of legal processes and institutions.
Doctrinal scholars typically write articles that argue the
law is confused and should be reconceptualized; articles that describe the law, find fault in it, and then suggest a specific reform; or articles that say courts are not following a rule they
purport to follow, and suggest that a new rule is emerging sub
silentio.52 Doctrinal scholarship also includes a body of work
that simply describes the state of the law, but this work is more
likely to be found in practice manuals than in law review
articles.
A classic example of one type of doctrinal scholarship is an
article that the great evidence scholar Edmund Morgan published in the Yale Law Journalin 1922. Some detractors of doctrinal scholarship would regard it as almost a parody of the
50. Id at 782.
51. Thus, Judge Posner defines doctrinal analysis as "the careful reading
and comparison of appellate opinions with a view to identifying ambiguities,
exposing inconsistencies between cases, reconciling holdings, and otherwise
exercising the characteristic skills of legal analysis." R. POSNER, THE FEDERAL
COURTS: CRisIs AND REFORM 324 (1985). Elsewhere, however, he amplifies in
a fashion that more fully captures the role of the traditional legal scholar:
[Tihe doctrinal analyst, in evaluating a judicial opinion, has long considered not only whether the opinion is clear, well reasoned, and consistent with the precedents, the statutes, and the Constitution, but
also whether it is right in the sense of being consistent with certain
premises about justice and administrative practicality.
Id at 325. Posner notes, however, that doctrinal analysts "do not go far" beyond the logic of the opinions they examine. Id
52. Probably the most famous example of this last type of article is Warren & Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193 (1890) (arguing that
tort action for invasion of privacy was emerging under cover of other
doctrines).
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enterprise. The title of the article is A Suggested Classiftcation
of Utterances Admissible as Res Gestae.53 Morgan attacked a
latin catch-phrase that the courts used as a substitute for thinkig about what they were doing, or at least as a substitute for
explaining their reasons for what they were doing.- He looked
at the types of out-of-court statements that courts had been receiving as res gestae evidence, suggested a functional reclassification of those cases with different labels, and explained why as
a matter of policy each of the classes he suggested should be admissible in evidence. 55
Unlike many law review articles, this one had an effect.
Morgan's attack on res gestae was successful. Morgan, Wigmore, and McCormick chased the term out of the codifications
and even out of the judicial opinions. 56 As the Maryland Court
of Appeals wrote in 1989: "The discredited shibboleth res ges'57
tae is no longer uttered in polite legal society.
Morgan's Hearsay Dangers and the Application of the
Hearsay Concept 58 is another prototype of doctrinal scholarship. Morgan looked at the conventional definition of hearsay
as assertions "offered for the truth of the matter asserted"5 9
and examined the way that courts had applied it in a number of
cases. He concluded that some statements whose use involved
hearsay dangers - that is, risks of reliance on the sincerity,
narrative ability, memory, or perception of an out-of-court declarant - were being classified as nonhearsay under the definition.60 Morgan therefore suggested that the courts examine
whether the use of a statement entailed hearsay dangers in deciding whether it was hearsay, instead of mechanically applying
61
the "truth of the matter asserted" formula.
Morgan's view on the concept of hearsay has not swept the
field, though a declarant-centered definition consistent with his
53.

31 YALE L.J. 229 (1922).

54. See id&at 229 n.1.
55. Id at 231-39.
56. See Cassidy v. State, 74 Md. App. 1, 9-16, 536 A.2d 666, 670-73 (1988).
57. Id, at 5, 536 A.2d at 668.
58. 62 HARV. L. REV.177 (1948).
59. 1& at 189.
60. Id. at 203-04.
61. Id at 218. "But should we not recognize that the rational basis for the
hearsay classification is not the formula, 'assertions offered for the truth of the
matter asserted,' but rather the presence of substantial risks of insincerity and
faulty narration, memory, and perception?" Id. Morgan later modified his
views. See Morgan, Hearsay, 25 Miss. L.J. 1, 8 (1953).
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view has been adopted in at least one state,62 and some courts
have adopted his view as a matter of common-law interpretation.63 It has had, however, an unusual degree of influence on
the scholarly literature about hearsay. 4
Doctrinal scholarship on evidence has had important professional accomplishments. It laid the foundation for abolition
of the rules of disqualification,6 the dead man's statute, 6 6 rule
against impeaching one's own witness,67 rules excluding lay
69
opinions, 68 and the requirement of the hypothetical question.
All these changes were influenced by doctrinal scholars whose
goal was to simplify and rationalize practice. Of course, the
work of codifying the laws of evidence was also vastly helped
by the existence of a body of systematizing scholarship. Knowledge of the ins and outs of legal doctrine, coupled with common
sense and some contact with practitioners, can give a scholar
the tools to help rationalize and simplify a procedural system.
In the law in general, the work of doctrinal scholars laid
the groundwork for the systematization and clarification of the
law through the adoption of such codes as the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
These efforts were empirical in a sense, but they were not scientifically empirical; the drafters used informal inquiries and
inferences from experience to answer factual questions. For
example, in preparing for his drafting role on the UCC, Karl
Llewellyn would visit banks and ask questions such as: " 'If I
62. See TEX. R. CRim. EVD. 801(c); TEX.R. CIv. EVD. 801(c); cf.Park, "I
Didn't Tell Them Anything About You'". Implied Assertions as Hearsay
Under the Federal Rules of Evidence, 74 MINN. L. REV. 783, 829 & n.238 (discussing possible revision of FED. R. EviD. 801).
63. See Lyle v. Keohler, 720 F.2d 426, 433 (6th Cir. 1983); Park v. Huff, 493
F.2d 923, 927-28 (5th Cir.), withdrawn on other grounds, 506 F.2d 849 (1974)
(en banc), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 824 (1975); United States v. Pacelli, 491 F.2d
1108, 1117-18 (2d Cir.), cert denied, 419 U.S. 826 (1974).
64. See, e.g., McCoRMIcK ON EVIDENCE § 250, at 740-41 (E. Cleary 3d ed.
1984); Finman, Implied Assertion as Hearsay: Some Criticism of the Uniform
Rules of Evidence, 14 STAN. L. REV.682, 695 (1962); Wellborn, The Definition
of Hearsay in the FederalRules of Evidence, 61 TFx. L. REV. 49, 59-60 (1982).
65. See, e.g., 3 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW §§ 501,
509, 516-18, at 594, 600-01, 603-08 (3d ed. 1940).
66. See, e.g., Ladd, The Dead Man Statute: Some Further Observations
and a Legislative Proposal,26 IowA L. REv. 207 (1941).
67. See, e.g., Ladd, Impeachment of One's Own Witness - New Developments, 4 U. Ciu. L. REV. 69 (1936).
68. See, eg., McCormick, Some Observations upon the Opinion Rule and
Expert Testimony, 23 TEx. L. REv. 109, 109-21 (1945).
69. See, e.g., J. WIGMORE, supra note 65, § 686, at 812; Ladd, Expert Testimony, 5 VAND. L. REV. 414, 425-27 (1952).
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were a cheque and I arrived in your bank where would I go?
...

What would be done to me first? Why?' "70

There was no

attempt, however, either in drafting the UCC or the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, to do large-scale quantitative studies, 71 nor is it clear that such studies were important or neces-

sary. 72 Llewellyn and Charles Clark were both legal realists,
and hence sympathetic to the cause of systematic empirical research, but they both also liked to get things done.
Despite some outstanding recent works, doctrinal scholarship on evidence seems to be on the decline. Certainly it is perceived as declining. 73 I believe the perception is widely shared,
but have no definite proof. There is, however, one source of
data, that is suggestive. In a recent compilation of most-cited
law review articles, no articles on any evidence topic were in
the top fifty. 74 I interpret this statistic, somewhat subjectively,
as meaning that doctrinal scholarship has waned and the new
evidence scholarship has not yet waxed, although I suppose
that it could be interpreted to mean that evidence simply is not
a big enough scholarly field to make the list in any case. Yet it
seems that a field that once elicited a five-volume work by Jeremy Bentham7 5 and that called forth the greatest English-language treatise 76 ought to have been able to make the list in its
prime. In the sister field of civil procedure, there is healthy
and contentious doctrinal scholarship on subjects such as class
actions,77 public law litigation,78 managerial judging,79 sum70.

W.

TWINING, KARL LLEWELLYN AND THE REALIST MOVEMENT 316

(1973).

71. Id. at 317-18; Clark, Fundamental Changes Effected by the New Federal Rules, 15 TENN. L. REV.551, 556-57 (1939).
72. W. TWINING, supra note 70, at 317-18.
73. See Lempert, supra note 25, at 61.
74. See Shapiro, The Most-Cited Law Review Articles, 73 CALIF. L. REV.
1540, 1549-51 (1985). Although many of the "most-cited" articles are on constitutional law or legal philosophy, the list also includes topics such as the Erie
doctrine, conflicts of law, and unconscionability under Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code. See id,
75.
76.

J. BENTHAM, RATIONALE OF JUDIcIAL EVIDENCE (J.S. Mill ed. 1827).
J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW (1st ed. 1904-1905).

77. See, e.g., Kane, Of Carrotsand Sticks: Evaluatingthe Role of the Class
Action Lawyer, 66 TEX. L. REV. 385 (1987); Miller & Crump, Jurisdictionand
Choice of Law in Multistate Class Actions After Phillips Petroleum Co. v.
Shutts, 96 YALE L.J. 1 (1986); Mullenix, Class Resolution of the Mass Tort
Case: A Proposed Federal ProcedureAct, 64 TEX. L. REV. 1039 (1986); Rhode,
Class Conflicts in Class Actions, 34 STAN. L. REV. 1183 (1982).
78. See, e.g., Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89
HARv. L. REV. 1281 (1976) (number 11 on list of 50 "most-cited" law review

HeinOnline -- 75 Minn. L. Rev. 862 1990-1991

1991]

EVIDENCE SCHOLARSHIP

mary judgment,8 0 personal jurisdiction,8 1 pleading,8 2 and sanc8 3s
tioning of frivolous claims
The golden age of doctrinal scholarship in the law reviews
on the rules of evidence seems to have been from about 1904 to
about 1954, from the first edition of Wigmore8 4 to the first edition of McCormick.8 5 It was during this period that greats like
Morgan, McCormick, and Maguire were writing in the law reviews, and Wigmore's treatise was at the peak of its influence.
Between the mid-1950s and the passage of the Federal Rules of
Evidence in 1975,86 there was a notable lull. 7 The Federal
Rules revived interest in evidence. Many of the articles, however, had a specialized focus, allowing one skeptical scholar to
characterize them as following the model: "What's Wrong with
the Twenty-Ninth Exception to the Hearsay Rule and How the
Addition of Three Words Can Correct the Problem."8 8
articles, see Shapiro, supra note 73, at 1550); Tobias, PublicLaw Litigation and
the FederalRules of Civil Procedure,74 CORNELL L. REV. 270 (1989).
79. See, e.g., Elliot, ManagerialJudging and the Evolution of Procedure,
53 U. Cm. L. REv. 306 (1986); Resnik, Managerial Judges, 96 HARV. L. REV.

376 (1982); Flanders, Blind Umpires HASTiNGS L.J. 505 (1984).

A Response to Professor Resnik, 35

80. See, e.g., Currie, Thoughts on Directed Verdicts and Summary Judgments, 45 U. Cm. L. REv. 72 (1977); Friedenthal, Cases on Summary Judgment Has There Been a Material Change in Standards?, 63 NOME DAME L.
REV. 770 (1988); Louis, Federal Summary Judgment Doctrine: A Critical
Analysis, 83 YALE L.J. 745 (1974).
81. See, e.g., Clermont, Restating TerritorialJurisdictionand Venue for
State and Federal Courts, 66 CORNELL L. REV. 411 (1981); Brilmayer, Consen
Contrac and Territory, 74 MINN. L. REv. 1 (1989); Twitchell, The Myth of
General Jurisdiction,101 HARv. L. REV. 610 (1988); Brilmayer, Related Contacts and PersonalJurisdiction,101 HARV. L. REV. 1444 (1988) (criticizing Professor Twitchell's article); Twitchell, A Rejoinder to ProfessorBrilmayer, 101
HARV.L. REv. 1465 (1988).
82. See, e.g., Marcus, The Revival of Fact Pleading Under the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure,86 COLUM. L. REv. 433 (1986).
83. See, e.g., Kramer, Viewing Rule 11 as a Tool to Improve Professional
Responsibility, 75 MINN. L. REV. 793 (1991); Risinger, Honesty in Pleadingand
Its Enforcement Some "Striking"Problems with Federal Rule Civil Procedure 11, 61 MINN. L. REV. 1 (1976); Schwarzer, Rule 11 Revisited, 101 HARV. L.
REV. 1013 (1988); Schwarzer, Sanctions Under the New FederalRule 11 - A
Closer Look, 104 F.R.D. 181 (1985); Vairo, Rule 11: A CriticalAnalysis, 75
F.R.D. 189 (1988).
84. J. WIGMORE, supra note 76.
85. C. McCoRMICK, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF EViDENCE (1st ed. 1954).
86. Pub. L. No. 93-595, 88 Stat. 1926 (1975).
87. Of course, there are exceptions to this statement, both in this period
and in the one following it. For fear of missing someone, I have not attempted
to include a list of these exceptional articles in this Essay.
88. Lempert, supra note 25, at 61.
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It is possible that there really has not been a decline in doctrinal scholarship in evidence, but merely a shift in the place of
publication away from the law reviews to the legal treatises.
We now have four excellent multi-volume treatises on evidence, three single-volume textbooks, and two first-rate student hornbooks - and here I am only counting the publications
produced by law professors; practitioners and in-house writers
for publishing houses have produced many more. In the field
of teaching materials, there are at least twelve up-to-date
casebooks or case and problem books published by leading law
professors, with more appearing every day. Treatises and hornbooks, however, are not really considered by law faculties to be
higher-order scholarship.8 9 Indeed, one noted scholar recently
wrote that "[t]he treatise is no longer even a credit to those
competing on the leading edge of legal thought." 9 It is true
that what appears in the law reviews is usually more ambitious
and creative than what appears in treatises and coursebooks.
The decline in publication of doctrinal articles on evidence
partly may be due to the decline of faith in the law as an autonomous discipline; the lack of self-confidence among scholars
that they can solve problems in the legal system through doctrinal analysis; the increasing number of true intellectuals in
academic law; the fact that the economic and social sciences
now have more to offer; and even market forces that have
driven potential or actual Ph.D.s into the law professor market.91 These factors help explain a decline in doctrinal scholarship in general, but do not explain its comparatively greater
decline in the field of evidence. In our sister fields of civil and
criminal procedure, a busy and influential set of scholars are
writing traditional law review articles.
I think that the reason for the relative decline is related to
certain characteristics of traditional doctrinal scholarship. I
say why I think
will describe those characteristics, and then
92
that they have contributed to the decline.
89. Sometimes I think that one could operationalize the definition of
higher-order scholarship applied by tenure and appointment committees by
saying that scholarship is that which is difficult to do, but which has no market value. Work is not scholarship if it can be sold to a book company that
will make a profit selling it to lawyers or law students.
90. Priest, Social Science Theory and Legal Education: The Law School as
University, 33 J. LEGAL EDUC. 437, 437 (1983).

91. See Posner, supra note 1, at 766-77.
92. My ideas about the characteristics of traditional doctrinal scholarship
have been influenced by an excellent essay by Edward L. Rubin. See Rubin,
The Practiceand Discourseof Legal Scholarship,86 MICH. L. REv. 1835 (1988).
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1. Doctrinal scholarship is authority-centered.93 Its subject matter is a critique of legal authority and its raw materials
are the law in the books - cases, statutes, court rules, records
of legislative proceedings. One might add that doctrinal scholarship is almost always disparaging of existing law. The critical
faculties honed in law school are directed at faultfinding in judicial opinions and legislation, which are criticized, belittled,
and deprecated.
2. Doctrinal scholarship is usually prescriptive, that is,
doctrinal scholarship advocates law reform. 94 In order to be regarded as higher-order scholarship, standard doctrinal scholarship must suggest an improvement in the law.95 It is not
enough to say what the law is, one must say what the law ought
to be. This may not always have been true. When Wigmore
published the first edition of his treatise in 1904-1905,9 the
mere work of organizing and systematizing was considered to
be almost a work of genius - although of course Wigmore also
distinguished himself with his vigorous advocacy of doctrinal
improvement. Prescription is not required or even desired in
many other fields of scholarly endeavor. A social scientist, for
example, can study phenomena without prescribing some sort
of improvement.
Why is describing and systematizing the law not enough,
even among those who recognize the value of doctrinal scholarship? Perhaps the work of describing and systematizing law is
simply easier than it used to be, now that we have the aid of
excellent indexing systems, computer-aided retrieval, and
judges who preside over the production of hornbook-like opinions. For whatever reason, to be recognized as a creative doctrinal scholar and to avoid being stigmatized as a mere drudge,
For an astute defense of doctrinal scholarship that is generally consistent with
the views expressed in this Essay, see Cramton, Demystifying Legal Scholar-

ship, 75 GEo. L.J. 1 (1986).
93. See Rubin, supra note 92, at 1848.
94. See id at 1847.
95. In this respect the goal of most doctrinal scholarship differs from what
at least one prominent legal philosopher has defined as the goal of scholarship
in general. Tony Kronman has said that "the scholar seeks knowledge for its
own sake, not for some further purpose, although the knowledge he acquires
may be instrumentally useful for other ends. To understand the world as it

truly is - this, and nothing else, is the goal of scholarship." Kronman, Foreword Legal Scholarship and Moral Education, 90 YALE L.J. 955, 967-68 (1981)
(foreword to issue containing articles prepared for a symposium on legal scholarship at Yale Law School).
96. J. WIGMORE, supra note 76.

HeinOnline -- 75 Minn. L. Rev. 865 1990-1991

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 75:849

one must not only describe the law, but offer an affirmative
thesis, an idea for reform or reconceptualization.
When making proposals for law reform, doctrinal scholars
use "fireside inductions" - a term I have borrowed from the
psychologist Paul Meehl to describe inductions we draw from
everyday experience, from introspection, from anecdotal evidence, and from culturally transmitted ideas. 97 They are usually aided by a good general education, by an understanding of
the legal process, by knowledge of social facts described in
cases, and by nonacademic experiences as law practice and serving on law reform committees - everything known from every
source other than academic disciplines outside the law. Of
course, traditional legal scholars also will use the work product
of other disciplines, when it is presented in a way that makes it
accessible.
To be recognized as valuable, doctrinal scholarship must be
concerned with the social impact of rules of law. References to
doctrinal scholars as "analysts" and as believers in a "closed
system" or an "autonomous discipline" may to some readers
carry the connotation that doctrinal scholars are formalists,
that is, that they believe the law is self-contained and that legal
reasoning is a process of finding first principles ("discovering
the law") and then drawing deductions from them, without regard to social impact. Modern doctrinal scholars cannot justly
be charged with formalism or conceptualism. Certainly there is
no twentieth-century evidence scholar who had the qualities
that have been attributed to formalists like Beale, Williston,
and Langdell. Perhaps this orientation is due to the influence
of Bentham, who never had any doubt that evidence law had to
serve some social purpose. Perhaps adjective law in the courtroom so clearly is an adjunct to accomplishing something else,
such as truth-finding, that no one is tempted to believe it is an
end in itself. In any event, the modern doctrinal scholar is
quite willing to look to experience as well as logic, to take societal impact into account in construing a rule instead of assuming that the internal logic of the law will solve the problem of
interpretation. Policy issues are freely considered, although
they might be resolved in a somewhat different, more eclectic
way than would be the case had the same issue been given to a
social psychologist or to a law and economics scholar.
3. Doctrinal scholars write for an intended audience of
lawmakers, not primarily for other scholars. In this respect
97.

Meehl, supra note 9, at 65-66.
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doctrinal scholarship differs markedly from the newer forms of
legal scholarship, which are rarely read by or intended for persons other than a small circle of similarly inclined scholars.
Doctrinal scholarship is ultimately addressed to lawyers, legislators, and judges. Its immediate audience may be other scholars, and indeed the individual scholar may only care how the
work is received by other scholars. Yet because doctrinal scholarship is prescriptive (it advocates law reform), the enterprise
only makes sense if the scholar's ideas are picked up by
rulemaking bodies, legislatures, or courts. Sometimes doctrinal
scholars make direct attempts to cause their prescriptions to
become law, as when a scholar writes an article about evidence
and then advocates its prescriptions as a member of an advisory
committee whose charge is to revise rules of evidence.
4. Doctrinal scholarship is noninteractive and noncumulative, at least in comparison with other disciplines. Doctrinal
scholars usually do not build elaborate structures based upon
each other's scholarship, or generate articles that themselves
give rise to other articles. Doctrinal scholarship has no
equivalent to Coase's article on social cost,98 which generated
an enormous body of law and economics literature on the
"Coase Theorem." 99 Cites by doctrinal scholars to other doctrinal scholars are often cites for authority-collections - as when
a scholar cites another for a proposition such as "a majority of
states follow the subjective test." Sometimes doctrinal scholars
cite other articles merely to show that their own ideas are different from those of predecessors. Another scholar's name may
be mentioned in a footnote, but it rarely appears in text. The
fact that a topic has been written about by other doctrinal
scholars usually does not give rise to a desire to respond or reply, but rather to a fear that the topic has been "pre-empted."
5. Doctrinal scholarship is very time-consuming. The
scholar who produces a major doctrinal article every year is
quite productive. One reason is that doctrinal scholars are
highly concerned with comprehensiveness and documentation.
98. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1960).
99. See, e.g., Donohue, Diverting the Coasean River: Incentive Schemes to
Reduce Unemployment, 99 YALE L.J. 549 (1989); Ellickson, The Casefor Coase
and Against "Coaseanism," 99 YALE L.J. 611 (1989); Schlag, An Appreciative
Comment on Coase's The Problem of Social Cost: A View From the Left, 1986
WIS. L. REV. 919; Schwab, Coase Defends Coase: Why Lawyers Listen and
Economists Do Not (Book Review), 87 MICH. L. REv. 1171 (1989) (reviewing R.
COASE, THE FIRM, THE MARKET, AND THE LAw (1989)); White, Coase and the
Courts: Economics for the Common Man, 72 IOWA L. REv. 577 (1987).
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The scholar feels that he or she must collect all relevant authorities, meet all arguments, and cite authority for everything.
Moreover, the scholar writes in areas where law-makers, using
the same tools the scholar uses, have already tried to meet all
objections. Unlike scholars in other disciplines, the doctrinal
scholar usually gets no help from graduate students. Contrast
the law and economics scholar, who can take a single hypothesis and apply it to different areas of the law without doing additional research, 10 0 or the social science scholar who works with
other scholars, has graduate students, and who can spin several
short articles out of the same basic experiment.
6. Doctrinal scholarship has a tradition of single authorship. Treatises and casebooks - usually regarded as lower-order scholarship - are often co-authored, but law review
articles usually are not. Partly, this tradition may be attributable to the fact that a division of labor makes less sense for doctrinal scholars than for others. Different doctrinal scholars
often bring the same tools to their work, because of similar
training and interests. Of course, the virtual absence of graduate students in law must also be a factor. Law students with an
academic bent usually produce their first published writing in
corroboration with other students (law review editors) and not
in corroboration with their teachers. Finally, the law school
tenure system may have played a role. In law, untenured
faculty members routinely are advised not to write with co-authors because they will be blamed if the article is bad and will
not get credit if it is good. This advice may be partly an artifact
of a now-abandoned tenure system under which the tenure decision was made less than three years after the candidate first
started teaching. Typically, because of the time-consuming nature of doctrinal scholarship, the candidate had only written
one article at the time of the tenure decision. If the piece had
been co-authored, the faculty would feel that it had no basis on
which to assess the candidate's individual merits. In other
100.

Cf. Priest, supra note 90, at 439 (discussing the possibilities in combin-

ing law and behavioral science). Priest states:
This approach makes possible rapid insights in comparison with ordinary legal scholarship, as should well be expected. A well-drafted set
of rules will have anticipated most objections that derive from the
ideas that dominate standard legal thought. But such rules will be as
vulnerable as an alien who cannot speak the native language to the
criticisms of a science with different presuppositions and organizing
thoughts.
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fields, a candidate has a longer track record, often with different co-authors, at the time of the tenure decision.
Earlier in this Essay, I said that I would attempt to explain
why there has been a relative decline in doctrinal scholarship
on evidence, and I now will make that effort. I think that the
lack of doctrinal writing on evidence can be attributed to one
principal cause: lack of doctrinal change.'' Because of the six
characteristics that I have just listed, doctrinal scholarship
needs doctrinal change in order to flourish. Doctrinal scholarship deals with law on the books and when the law on the
books itself does not change, there is no grist for the mill. It is
prescriptive and addressed to judges and lawmakers, and so
scholars run out of sensible proposals for reform sooner or later
if the law remains static. When judges and lawmakers consistently reject reform proposals, there is a sense of demoralization
and unreality. Doctrinal scholarship is noncumulative so the
work of prior scholars doesn't provide a basis for further work
the scholarly dialogue that occurs in other fields is muted
here. Doctrinal scholarship is time-consuming and its practitioners do it alone, so they are less likely to embark on the
risky venture of writing in a field that might be pre-empted. It
takes a gambler to do research and preparation to write about
something in an area that has not changed.
The recent history of evidence reform has contributed to
the lessening of the output of doctrinal scholarship. The Model
Code of Evidence, a product of the best doctrinal scholars of the
first half of this century, would have made important doctrinal
changes. 02 It was an utter failure, however. It drowned in a
flood of procedural conservatism. No state ever adopted it.
The Federal Rules of Evidence, by contrast, were closer to being a restatement of existing law than a radical reform. The
Federal Rules of Evidence's advisory committee was more cautious than the Model Code's authors, and Congress's pre-enactment changes further moderated the modest reforms proposed
by the committee.10 3 Since their enactment by Congress, the
101. The causal path, of course, is probably two-way to some extent.
102.

See MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE (1942). For example, the Model Code

contained a simple but sweeping reform of the hearsay rule - hearsay would
have been admissible whenever the declarant was either unavailable or on the
witness stand. See id- Rule 503.
103. The dying declarations exception to the hearsay prohibition provides a
good example. The common law only allowed into evidence statements by victims offered in a prosecution for criminal homicide. FED. R. EvID. 804(b)(2)
advisory committee's note. As submitted to Congress, the proposed exception
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original rules have survived virtually unchanged, with very mi10 4
nor tinkering.
Scholars who are primarily equipped to write doctrinal articles, and who love the law of evidence, will need to have determination or patience. They can go ahead with their work at
the risk that they will not be able to offer novel insights, or
they can wait for doctrinal change and write about something
else while waiting.
Of course, changes in the traditions of doctrinal scholarship
would help the plight of doctrinal scholars to some degree. For
example, a move in the direction of scholarly free proof, under
which the scholar was freed from the burden of exhaustive citation, and was allowed to make greater use of lawyer's reports,
journalistic methods, and personal experiences, would ease the
burdensome and time-consuming nature of the enterprise. Furthermore, if doctrinal scholars became more willing to support
as well as attack existing authority, that change might open the
way to scholarship elaborating reasons for existing law that
judges themselves have not had the leisure or specialized expertise to appreciate. The traditions of doctrinal scholarship,
however, are not likely to change easily, nor is it clear that they
should.
Even when not blessed with conditions that encourage
pure doctrinal scholarship, the traditionally trained scholar can
still play useful roles. One such role is that of collaborator with
a scholar who has nontraditional training. For example, there
is plenty of room for fruitful collaboration with social psychologists and other social scientists. Empirical research on the rules
of evidence is still in its early stages. For example, empirical
research on the hearsay rule, despite some promising beginnings during the early realist era,10 5 has hardly begun. Scholars can employ methods of social science to attempt to answer
questions such as whether the hearsay rule really has an impact or whether juries really overvalue hearsay. Of course this
work can be done, without the help of doctrinal scholars, by social scientists with legal training. Yet there are sensible reawould have extended its coverage to statements made under belief of impending death offered in any court proceeding, civil or criminal. Id. advisory committee's note. As enacted by Congress, however, the exception applies in all
civil cases, but only applies in criminal cases involving homicides. Id
104. Compare FED. R. EVID. with Pub. L. No. 93-595, 88 Stat. 1926 (1975)
(Federal Rules of Evidence as originally enacted).
105. See, e.g., Hutchins & Schlesinger, Some Observations on the Law of
Evidence: Spontaneous Exclamations, 28 COLUM. L. REv. 432 (1928).
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sons for a division of labor. The fields of evidence law and of
social psychology are large enough so that it is difficult to be an
up-to-date expert in both. Doctrinal scholars can play an invaluable role in helping social scientists to formulate legally relevant questions, and to execute the research in a way that makes
it pertinent to law reform. For example, research studying how
juries would evaluate hearsay that is now excluded is more relevant to the issue of whether the hearsay rule should be relaxed than is research studying of how juries treat hearsay that
is now admitted. Moreover, research that studies how juries
evaluate hearsay under the system of procedural safeguards
that would accompany major reform of the hearsay rule is
more relevant than research that ignores such safeguards. The
scholar who is thoroughly familiar with evidence doctrine can
be of great help in making sure that studies focus upon areas
that are relevant to reform.
CONCLUSION
Before long, external events are likely to check, or even reverse, the relative decline of doctrinal scholarship on evidence.
Doctrinal change may finally be accelerating. The United
States Supreme Court has recently taken an unusual interest in
evidence law.10 6 The American Law Institute has shown renewed interest in the attorney-client privilege. 10 7 Social
changes have brought new rules of evidence protecting rape
victims 0 8 and facilitating child abuse prosecutions. 10 9 The expert witness explosion, and complaints about the misuse of experts, surely will have an effect on evidence doctrine sooner or
later.
Law schools should continue to nurture and encourage doctrinal scholarship on evidence as on other legal subjects. One
reason is that doctrinal scholarship fits in well with law teaching. A law professor who has written a treatise on evidence
106. See, e.g., Beach Aircraft Corp. v. Rainey, 488 U.S. 153 (1988); Huddleston v. United States, 485 U.S. 681 (1988); Bourjaily v. United States, 483 U.S.
171 (1987).
107. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS (Tent.
Draft No. 2, 1989).
108. See Galvin, ShieldingRape Victims in the State and Federal Courts: A
Proposalfor the Second Decade, 70 MINN. L. REV. 763, 812-903 (1986).
109. See Buckley, Background and Overview of Child Sexual Abuse: Law
Reforms in the Mid-1980's, 40 U. Mum L. REV. 5, 7-10 (1985) (introduction to
symposium on child sexual abuse prosecution); Levy, Using "Scientific" Testimony to Prove Child Sexual Abuse, 23 FAM. L.Q. 383, 402-03 (1989).
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will be a master of the subject. The scholar's writing will enrich his or her teaching, and insights from the classroom can be
used in writing. By contrast, the legal scholar who writes on
Bayes' Theorem will not be able to use it extensively in class,
however important it may be in other ways.
One of the differences between a professional school and a
graduate school is that our students do not want to be what we
are. Law students want to be lawyers. They are not ready to
follow us wherever we want to go. We cannot use law students
in the way that graduate schools use graduate students, nor can
we expect them to stand still for being used in that fashion. In
the new world of legal scholarship, some of the best scholars do
not really have the calling to teach in a professional school.
Nonetheless, they are required to teach law students, and they
rely upon students and the profession for financial support.
For them, teaching can become an unpleasant duty. The presence of doctrinal scholars on a law faculty gives students teachers who are closer to the profession and helps reduce alienation
between students and faculty.
It is important that doctrinal scholars maintain a connection with evidence students. Evidence is a bar subject, and virtually every student in the country takes the course. Changes
in evidence law, except in some special areas like the protection
of rape victims, tend to come from, or at least be filtered
through, the bar and academic lawyers. The bar tends to be
procedurally conservative and to want to retain the system that
it has learned. The recent history of evidence reform has been
one in which reforms were advanced by academic lawyers and
their allies, and rejected because of the influence of the trial
bar. By maintaining communication with students and imbuing
them with a questioning attitude toward evidence doctrine, doctrinal scholars can help lay the foundation for doctrinal
improvement.
Doctrinal scholarship will continue to be important for law
reform, in evidence as in other fields. Rationalization and improvement of evidence law often occurs through the medium of
bar committees and advisory groups. Academic lawyers who
are members of these groups have the most leisure to analyze
and the greatest detachment from the biasing effect of client
representation. Of course, academic lawyers armed with tools
derived from other disciplines will make important contributions. There will, however, always be room for studying the
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structure of doctrine, and for making recommendations for reform based upon fireside inductions, practical experience, common sense, and general education.
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